In this paper I analyze how debt structure and the strategic interaction between shareholders and creditors in the event of default a¤ect expected stock returns. By endogenizing shareholders'decision to default, the model generates new predictions linking …rm characteristics to expected stock returns through an intuitive economic mechanism. In particular, the model predicts that expected stock returns are higher for …rms that face high debt renegotiation di¢ culties, and that have a large fraction of secured or convertible debt. Expected stock returns are lower for …rms whose shareholders maintain strong bargaining power, and for …rms subject to high liquidation costs. Using a large sample of publicly traded US …rms between 1985 and 2005, I present new evidence on the link between debt structure, renegotiation frictions, and stock returns, which is supportive of the model's predictions.
Introduction
A …rm usually defaults when shareholders are unable to make contractual payments to debtholders. Shareholders may, however, also have incentives to act strategically to induce default and recover a substantial fraction of …rm value, even though they are residual claimants. While a number of theoretical papers explicitly consider this strategic default and the interaction between claimholders in the context of optimal capital structure and corporate bond pricing, very little is known on how default and the strategic behavior of claimholders a¤ect stock returns. 1 Furthermore, corporate debt often includes conversion rights and covenants that secure part of the debt. Existing research remains silent on the implications of these covenants for stock return. In this paper I attempt to extend this research by investigating how such covenants and the strategic behavior of shareholders upon default in ‡uence expected stock returns. More speci…cally, I analyze how secured and convertible debt and possible renegotiation frictions a¤ect expected stock returns.
To shed new light on the in ‡uence of debt structure on the strategic behavior in default and on stock returns, I extend a contingent claims model by looking at the type of debt and at renegotiation frictions. I then analyze the implications for stock returns. The model allows for renegotiation of debt contracts between shareholders and bondholders, and permits to analyze the role of renegotiation frictions and debt structure. The model generates predictions regarding liquidation costs, bargaining in default, and expected stock returns that are consistent with the available empirical evidence. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding the relation between the type of debt, renegotiation frictions, and stock returns.
More speci…cally, the predictions are as follows. Expected stock returns are higher for …rms that face higher renegotiation frictions, that have a greater fraction of their debt that is secured, or that have more convertible debt in their capital structure. These e¤ects are stronger for …rms close to default. The explanation for this is that large renegotiation frictions and a large fraction of secured debt reduce the ability of shareholders to extract …rm value from creditors upon default and hence increase the risk of equity. By contrast, expected stock returns are lower for distressed …rms whose shareholders have large bargaining power and for …rms facing high liquidation costs. In these situations, shareholders will be able to extract more …rm value from creditors upon default, hence decreasing equity risk. Using a large sample of publicly traded US …rms between 1985 and 2005, I present new evidence on the link between renegotiation frictions, debt structure, and stock returns, which is supportive of the model's predictions.
The economic mechanism that is driving the results is simple. Shareholders have decision 1 Recent empirical work shows that bargaining in default between claimholders plays an important role in determining yield spreads and is economically signi…cant for stock returns [see Davydenko and Strebulaev (2006) , Garlappi et al. (2006) , and Garlappi and Yan (2007) ].
rights regarding the …rm's policy choices and make operating decisions. To the extent that these operating decisions a¤ect the risk of a …rm's cash ‡ow, these decisions should impact a …rm's equilibrium rate of return. One important such decision is whether or not to service debt payments. If shareholders decide not to service debt even though they could, they default strategically. Shareholders will however only default strategically when they are better o¤ in default than they would be if the …rm remained a going concern. A number of empirical papers provide evidence that shareholders receive a considerable fraction of …rm value upon default. 2 Therefore, depending on the amount of cash ‡ow that shareholders expect to receive in default, they will decide to default strategically or not. Since renegotiation frictions, bargaining power and debt structure directly a¤ect this decision to default, they should also impact stock returns. To test my model, I form a large sample of publicly traded US …rms for the period from 1985 to 2005. I then test the predictions from the model using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology and non-parametric portfolio analysis. I …nd that the data are consistent with the model's predictions. First, I …nd that stock returns are lower for …rms with high liquidation costs and for …rms whose shareholders have high bargaining power. This …nding is more pronounced for …rms close to distress and it supports the intuition that creditors'willingness to negotiate is higher when costs of liquidation or the bargaining power of shareholders are high. These results are consistent with the …ndings by Garlappi et al. (2006) .
Second, I …nd that stock returns are increasing with renegotiation frictions. When renegotiation of debt contracts becomes more di¢ cult, shareholders anticipate this and require a higher return as compensation for the foregone share they would receive in renegotiation. This e¤ect is present for both distressed and healthy …rms.
Third, stock returns are increasing with the fraction of …rms' debt that is secured. A higher proportion of secured debt reduces the ability of shareholders to extract …rm value from creditors and thus increases the risk of equity. This e¤ect is more important for distressed than healthy …rms.
Finally, I …nd that stock returns are increasing with the fraction of …rm's debt that is convertible. A higher proportion of convertible debt increases the optimal conversion threshold for convertible bond holders because they do not want to loose their coupon payments. This emphasizes the convex part of the payo¤ function, hence increasing the risk for shareholders.
To provide further support for these results, I subject the main …ndings to a number of robustness checks. Notably, I address a possible endogeneity bias regarding secured and convertible debt, and investigate whether the results hold with alternative proxies for …nancial distress. I …nd that the main results are robust to alternative measures of distress and that they are unlikely driven by endogeneity.
Overall, this paper contributes in at least two dimensions. First, while prior research o¤ers some insights on the implications of bargaining in default and liquidation costs on stock returns, this is the …rst paper that investigates the e¤ect of renegotiation frictions on expected stock returns. Whereas good proxies for bargaining power still are missing, a number of empirical and theoretical papers have documented …rm characteristics that proxy for renegotiation frictions [see e.g. Gilson et al. (1990) , Betker (1995) ]. These frictions turn out to be an important determinant of stock returns and need to be taken into account in order to determine how investors are a¤ected when a …rm heads towards bankruptcy. Second, instead of investigating …rms with a simple capital structure, this paper analyzes the pricing implications in the presence of more complex capital structures, including secured and convertible debt. Empirical evidence points to a relation between leverage and expected stock returns. This study investigates how a special type of debt a¤ects expected stock returns and shows that the allocation of property rights implicit in debt covenants is important for stock returns. To the best of my knowledge, this is the …rst paper that investigates systematically the e¤ects of secured and convertible debt …nancing on default and expected stock returns.
This paper is most closely related to the paper by Garlappi et al. (2006) . They investigate the relation between default probabilities and stock returns in the light of strategic behavior of shareholders. They …nd that expected stock returns are not generally positively related to default probabilities. They argue that this is not violating the risk return trade-o¤, since shareholders with high bargaining power are able to extract rents from debtholders reducing the risk of default. Accordingly, they …nd that …rms whose shareholders have high bargaining power earn lower returns. Conversely, …rms whose shareholders have little or no bargaining power earn higher returns that tend to increase with the default probability.
This paper also continues a line of research that uses contingent claim methods to value corporate securities. Since the seminal works of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) , this approach has been extended into various directions in order to make the models more realistic. In particular, models were developed to look at the default of …rms more closely [Leland (1994) , Longsta¤ and Schwartz (1995) , and Leland and Toft (1996) ]. More recent models analyze the e¤ects of strategic behavior of shareholders on asset prices [Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) [Hackbarth et al. (2007) ]. Finally, this paper extends the results by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2006) who explore the empirical relation between corporate debt prices and …rm characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives empirical predictions. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and presents the data. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 contains robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Model and Empirical Predictions
Corporate debt often includes features such as conversion rights or debt covenants that secure part of the debt [see e.g. Mikkelson (1981) , Leeth and Scott ( 1989) , Loncarski et al. (2006) ]. In this paper I extend the contingent claim framework of Fan and Sundaresan (2000) in order to account for this evidence. I focus on the e¤ect of renegotiation frictions and debt structure on expected stock returns. The purpose is to derive testable implications for expected stock returns and to illustrate the logic and economic intuition underlying these implications.
Model Setup
Throughout the paper, managers act in the best interest of shareholders and investment policy is …xed. Assets are traded continuously in arbitrage free markets. The term structure is ‡at with riskless rate r at which investors may borrow and lend freely. Cash ‡ows from operations are independent of capital structure choices and evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion with a constant growth rate > 0 and a constant volatility , so that
where B t is a standard Brownian motion. Because the …rm pays taxes on corporate income, it has an incentive to issue debt. Once debt has been issued, shareholders have the option to default on the …rm's debt obligation. If the …rm defaults on its debt, it can be liquidated at a proportional cost 2 [0; 1]. Debtholders have absolute priority in liquidation, leaving them with (1 ) (X), where (X) is the value of the unlevered …rm at default. Moreover, costless renegotiation of the debt contract is possible, where the value of the …rm is split between shareholders and creditors according to their bargaining power. In this simplest case, renegotiation will never fail since liquidation is costly whereas renegotiation is costless. In other words, debtholders accept to receive less than the contractual coupon to keep the …rm a going concern. 3 Because creditors give up some …rm value to shareholders in renegotiation, this can be viewed as a deviation from the Absolute Priority Rule (APR); a fact that has been documented empirically [Gilson et al. (1990) , Franks and Torous (1989) , and Asquith et al. (1994) ].
Following Davydenko and Strebulaev (2006) , suppose that renegotiation fails with probability q due to exogenous factors, in which case the claims are settled in bankruptcy accord- 3 Introducing proportional renegotiation costs does not change the qualitative results as long as liquidation costs are larger than renegotiation costs. Intuitively, renegotiation costs reduce the amount of cash ‡ow that is shared between shareholders and bondholders in renegotiation.
ing to the APR. The parameter q may measure the likelihood of a failure of an out-of-court workout, or the possibility that a Chapter 11 reorganization is converted into a liquidation procedure according to Chapter 7. Bris et al. (2007) show, for instance, that the identity of the judge matters whether there is an APR violation or not. Judges in Arizona systematically violate APR, while New York judges do so only on occasion.
Once renegotiation is initiated, shareholders and creditors play a Nash bargaining game with respective bargaining power and (1 ). When = 1, equityholders have all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to creditors. When = 0, debtholders make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to shareholders. The allocation of the renegotiation surplus between the …rm's claimants with sharing rule is determined as follows. The incremental value for shareholders in bargaining with default threshold X B is (X B ) 0, because the alternative to bargaining is liquidation, in which shareholders receive nothing. The incremental value for creditors is (1 ) (X B ) (1 ) (X B ), since the alternative to bargaining is liquidation with costs : Therefore, the sharing rule for the renegotiation surplus upon default satis…es
with the solution = :
Equation (3) shows that shareholders receive more of the renegotiation surplus, the higher their bargaining power and the higher the liquidation costs . More speci…cally, they get (X B ) upon default if there is renegotiation. By contrast, bondholders receive (1 ) (X B ) in renegotiation, and (1 ) (X B ) if renegotiation is not successful and the …rm is liquidated.
The next three subsections analyze speci…c cases of this model.
Straight Debt
This subsection considers the case of a …rm with outstanding equity and single risky perpetual debt with an instantaneous coupon c. I assume without loss of generality that this coupon c is constant. I do therefore not explicitly model the optimal amount of debt to issue, which is clearly an endogenous aspect of the model. Although my empirical work will try to take that endogeneity into account, the model is only a partial account of return determination. Assuming a tax rate 2 [0; 1], the after-tax cash ‡ow to shareholders is (X t ) = (X t c) (1 ) . This after-tax cash ‡ow plus the expected change in the value of equity must be equal to the required return for shareholders. The value of equity E(X) therefore satis…es the following di¤erential equation
where E X and E XX are the …rst and second derivatives of the equity value with respect to the state variable X. The general solution to this ordinary di¤erential equation is
where A and B are constants, determined by boundary conditions, and where 1 and 2 are given by
The boundary conditions are given by the following equations:
The expected value of equity upon default is (1 q)
(1 ) (value-matching condition, equation 9 ). This expected value shows that for a given default threshold X B , higher bargaining power of shareholders or lower renegotiation di¢ culties q imply a larger expected cash ‡ow to shareholders.
I assume that the risk premium is exogenous in this model, hence, there is a one-to-one mapping between expected returns and the equity beta. To get predictions for expected stock returns, I derive the equity beta by applying Itô's lemma to the value of equity.
Shareholders have the option to default on the …rm's debt obligation and choose the default threshold X B that maximizes the value of equity. Using contingent claims techniques and the boundary conditions in equations 8 to 10, the optimization problem of the shareholders yields the following Proposition (see the Appendix 1).
Proposition 1:
Assume that the cash ‡ow of the …rm is described by equation (1) . When shareholders choose the value-maximizing default threshold X B , the value of equity is
the total value of the …rm is
and the value of debt is
where X B is the endogenous triggering point of renegotiation,
and is
Moreover, the equity beta is given by 
where X is the beta of the …rm's cash ‡ow and is normalized to 1.
Proposition 1 shows that the value of equity is composed of two parts. The …rst part is the after-tax present value of cash ‡ows to shareholders ignoring the option to default. The second term captures the after-tax value of the option to default. Since the term in the square brackets is negative, the option to default increases the value of equity. Note also that higher liquidation costs or bargaining power increase the option value of defaulting and thus the value of equity. The value of debt is also composed of two parts. The …rst term re ‡ects the value of risk free debt. The second term captures the change in the value of debt due to the option to default. For the equity beta, since the second part of the equation is positive, the beta of equity is larger than the normalized beta of the …rm's cash ‡ow. Note, too, that ; ; and q are between zero and one, and p 2r= 2 6 < 0. I …rst address the question of how renegotiation frictions a¤ect equity value and stock returns by analyzing the derivative of E(X; q) and E (q) : Suppose for instance, that renegotiation of debt contracts becomes more di¢ cult (q increases). This could occur when debt is more dispersed or a greater fraction of debt is held publicly. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue that the presence of many dispersed bondholders makes renegotiation di¢ cult. Empirically, Asquith et al. (1994) and Gilson et al. (1990) document that about half of the …rms attempting an informal distressed restructuring end up in Chapter 11, and relate the probability of bankruptcy to the complexity of the …rm's debt structure. Intuitively we can thus argue that the value of equity decreases as the parameter q increases. Calculating the e¤ect of a marginal increase of q on the value of equity, we …nd that it is negative. Note also that @X B =@q < 0, which means that the default threshold is decreasing with q: The reason for this is that shareholders are less likely to default strategically since they know that the probability of renegotiation failure increases, decreasing the expected value of equity.
When we look at the beta of equity, the sign of the impact of q is reversed (@ =@q > 0): This means that risk and therefore expected stock returns are an increasing function of renegotiation frictions. The intuition for this new prediction is as follows. Renegotiation frictions measure how easily renegotiation can be carried out. As argued above, if bond or stock ownership is dispersed, debt renegotiation is likely to be di¢ cult and might fail. In such a case claims are liquidated according to the APR where shareholders receive nothing. By contrast, negotiation with only a small number of lenders and shareholders might be relatively easy and e¢ cient, and shareholders will be able to extract rents from creditors. Therefore, higher renegotiation frictions represent a higher cash ‡ow risk for shareholders. This is re ‡ected in higher expected stock returns.
Indeed, going one step further, one may argue that this e¤ect should be stronger for distressed …rms. Consider a mature …rm that has a low leverage and highly valued assets. Such a …rm is unlikely to default, and the discussed e¤ect regarding strategic default might be negligible. Conversely, the e¤ect should be more important for distressed …rms. Using cross derivatives, we see that @ 2 =@q@X < 0 (see the Appendix 2). This means that the positive e¤ect of the parameter q is stronger for low values of the state variable X. This leads to the …rst testable prediction.
Prediction 1:
Firms that face high renegotiation frictions have higher expected stock returns. This e¤ ect is stronger for distressed …rms.
The two other parameters of interest are liquidation costs and bargaining power of shareholders : Taking derivatives of the equity beta with respect to those two parameters I get @ =@ < 0 and @ =@ < 0: This means that expected stock returns are a decreasing function of liquidation costs and bargaining power of shareholders. In both cases, default is not equivalent to a zero payo¤ for shareholders, since they get a larger fraction of asset value upon default than they would get according to the APR. From the value-matching condition we see that the expected value of equity increases with and : This is re ‡ected in lower risk and hence in lower expected stock returns. Thus, expected stock returns are lower for …rms whose shareholders have high bargaining power and for which liquidation costs are high, corroborating the results by Garlappi et al. (2006) .
Secured Debt
Secured debt makes up a large part of corporate debt and has received considerable attention in the literature. It has been argued that secured debt may increase …rm value by limiting possible legal claims in bankruptcy [Scott (1977 [Scott ( , 1979 ] and that it reduces administrative and enforcement costs, prevents asset substitution and alleviates the underinvestment problem [Smith and Warner (1979a) , Johnson and Stulz (1985) ]. Morellec (2001) also shows that pledging part of the …rm's assets as collateral to the debt contract by issuing secured debt increases …rm value. He shows that, on one hand, secured debt prevents a …rm from selling assets, increases its liquidation value and reduces the default probability. On the other hand, the security provision also limits the operating ‡exibility of the …rm. The optimal pledge trades of these costs and bene…ts.
The wide use of secured debt has also been documented empirically. Barclay and Smith (1995) , for instance, document that on average one third of a …rm's debt is secured. Leeth and Scott (1989) report for a sample of small business loans that about sixty percent of the loans are secured by some type of collateral, and Houston and James (1996) …nd in their study on the mix of private and public debt that about 30 percent of debt is secured. Despite this considerable fraction of secured debt that …rms tend to hold, existing models remain silent on implications of security provisions for stock returns. In addition, the valuation setting is often not rich enough to incorporate empirical regularities such as costly liquidation and the possibility of renegotiation. It is, however, likely that the proportion of secured debt that a …rm has is an important determinant of what shareholders can expect to receive in default. 4 When debt is secured, debtholders require the …rm to pledge a part of the …rm's assets as collateral. Equityholders cannot sell the collateral or increase its risk without agreement of debtholders. In this way equityholders can commit to a low risk operation policy, resulting in higher debt prices, a lower risk premium and hence in lower cost of borrowing. Note that there are administrative, processing and monitoring expenses associated with secured debt borrowing. Smith and Warner (1979b) argue that these expenses are paid by lenders, although the costs will be transferred to equityholders as higher borrowing costs.
Take the model from the previous subsection. Suppose now that debtholders can secure part of their debt with a collateral which they can access at zero cost. The contract speci…es that upon default, debtholders get a fraction 2 [0; 1] of the unlevered …rm value for certain, and over the residual value they negotiate with shareholders. 5 In such a setup, the amount of collateral relates naturally to the proportion of secured debt. The higher the collateral speci…ed by , the greater the fraction of secured debt.
Denote by X S the endogenous default threshold. Suppose furthermore that some other frictions impede renegotiation as discussed in the straight debt case. Since shareholders have no claim on the assets that are used as collateral for the secured debt upon default, the expected value of equity is reduced by the fraction of the …rm's secured assets. Compared with the straight debt case, shareholders get a smaller cash ‡ow (by (1 )) upon default, all else equal.
Shareholders' objective is again to choose the default threshold X S that maximizes the value of equity. Solving the optimization problem yields Proposition 2 (see the Appendix 1).
Proposition 2:
Assume that the cash ‡ow of the …rm is described by equation (1) . When a …rm has secured debt outstanding and shareholders choose the value-maximizing default threshold X S , the value of equity is
the value of the …rm is
and the debt value is
with the default threshold X S given by
and de…ned as in Proposition 1. Moreover, the equity beta is given by
As argued by Morellec (2001) , secured debt reduces the cost of borrowing for bondholders in two ways. First, it reduces the default probability since it prevents the …rm from selling the secured assets. Moreover, shareholders will less likely default strategically because there is less scope for equityholders to exploit debtholders in renegotiation. Second, security provisions reduce bankruptcy costs in the event of default because of lower enforcement cost. In this case, the reduction in default costs is q [X S =(r )] (1 ) (X=X S ) (see equation 18 for …rm value).
Regarding the empirical prediction, if a larger proportion of debt is secured, shareholders will be able to extract less from creditors in case of renegotiation. This implies that the value of equity is decreasing with , i.e. @E S =@ < 0. Moreover, the default threshold X S is a decreasing function of the fraction of secured debt because shareholders will wait longer before they default. Taking the derivative of beta with respect to ; we see that S E is an increasing function of the fraction of secured debt (@ S E =@ > 0). A higher fraction of secured debt reduces the ability of shareholders to extract …rm value from creditors and thus increases the risk of equity, especially for …rms that are close to default (@ 2 =@ @X < 0). From this discussion it follows that we should observe higher stock returns for …rms with a larger fraction of debt that is secured.
Prediction 2:
Firms that have a large fraction of debt that is secured have higher expected stock returns. This e¤ ect is stronger for distressed …rms.
Convertible Debt
Corporate debt routinely incorporates conversion options, and …rms with capital structures that include convertible debt claims represent a broad spectrum of …rm size and industry classi…cation [see Mikkelson (1981) and Loncarski et al. (2006)]. There are numerous theoretical explanations for the use of convertible debt, including information asymmetry problems [Stein (1992) ], agency costs [Jensen and Meckling (1976) ], and the sequential-…nancing hypothesis [Mayers (1998)] .
A standard approach for valuing convertible debt is to decompose the convertible bond value into an investment and option component [see e.g. Ingersoll (1977) ]. The idea behind this decomposition is that both components can be priced separately, where the investment component is typically obtained as the value of straight debt of an appropriate benchmark …rm. This practical approach, however assumes implicitly that the conversion right does not a¤ect the default strategy. Since the goal of this paper is to analyze the economic mechanism of shareholders'choice to default, the interaction between convertible debtholders and equityholders must be considered. I therefore follow a di¤erent strategy by extending the straight debt model from the previous subsection and by adding convertible debt to the capital structure.
Consider a …rm with outstanding equity, perpetual straight debt with coupon cs and a perpetual convertible bond with instantaneous coupon cc as long as the …rm is solvent and no conversion takes place. I assume for simplicity that straight debt and convertible debt have the same priority. This assumption is not critical for the subsequent analysis, and other types of seniority can also be incorporated and would lead to qualitatively similar results [see Lyandres and Zhdanov (2006) ].
In this model the fraction of convertible debt is a direct function of the two coupons cs and cc. Upon default, the holders of straight and convertible debt are entitled to payo¤s of cs=(cs + cc) (X B ) and cc=(cs + cc) (X D ); where (X D ) is the fraction of …rm value that goes to the two classes of bondholders. Convertible debtholders can convert their bond into a fraction of equity. This value of equity corresponds to the value of equity right after conversion when there is only straight debt outstanding.
Since the payo¤ from the conversion increases with the …rm's cash ‡ow, it will be optimal to convert when the state variable X hits an upper bound X C . Assume for simplicity that there is no call provision, that the whole debt issue must be converted at the same point in time, and that there is no conversion before default. To value equity, straight and convertible debt I must consider lower and upper boundary conditions. Denote by X D the renegotiation trigger value. The boundary conditions for the value of equity in default are thus identical to the case of straight debt. If the cash ‡ow hits the upper bound, debtholders lose their coupon claim and get the conversion value ( (X C ) D (X C )), where (X C ) is the value of the …rm right after conversion (with equity and only straight debt outstanding), and D (X C ) is the value of straight debt after conversion. Shareholders receive the remaining …rm value, namely (1 ) ( (X C ) D (X C )). Thus, after conversion the …rm is leveraged with only straight debt, corresponding to the case discussed in subsection 2.2.
To obtain the value of convertible debt, de…ne ' = cc=(cs + cc). If there is renegotiation in default, convertible debtholders bargain with straight bondholders on their side as one party against shareholders and recover
If there is liquidation, convertible bondholders share the unlevered …rm value after liquidation costs and get
Upon conversion, convertible bondholders obtain a fraction of the value of equity after conversion, or
Shareholders'objective is again to maximize the value of equity. Solving the optimization problem yields Proposition 3 (see the Appendix 1).
Proposition 3:
Assume that the cash ‡ow of the …rm is described by equation (1) . When a …rm has convertible debt outstanding and shareholders maximize the value of equity, it is given by
and the value of convertible debt is given by
where AR and AC are
and 1 and 2
The value of equity consists of three parts. The …rst part is the after-tax present value of cash ‡ows to shareholders ignoring the option to default or to convert. The AR-term is the current value of a binary up-and-out put option that pays one unit at a future point in time when the asset value hits the default barrier X B without having crossed the conversion threshold X C before. Accordingly, the AC -term can be seen as the present value of a binary down-and-out call option that pays one unit only if X hits X C and no default has occurred.
As noted by Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2006) , endowing bondholders with an option to convert their bond into equity results in additional strategic interdependence between shareholders and creditors. Thus, the optimal default and conversion barriers result from a Nash game between equity-and debtholders. Equityholders choose the equity value maximizing default strategy given their beliefs about the bondholder's conversion strategy. Accordingly, debtholders select a conversion strategy to maximize the convertible debt value given their beliefs about shareholders'default strategy.
These restrictions can be expressed by the two smooth-pasting conditions
and
: I obtain the optimal (Nash equilibrium) default and conversion thresholds by jointly solving the two smooth-pasting conditions numerically. I solve for these thresholds using the following baseline assumptions: = 5%, = 0:5; r = 6%, = 2%; cs = 5; = 30%; q = 0:5; = 0:5 and = 0:3: In this base case environment, renegotiation fails half of the time, shareholders and bondholders have the same amount of bargaining power 6 , and bondholders receive half of the equity at conversion. I have veri…ed that the results are not sensitive to the choice of these parameter values.
As in the previous subsections, the equity beta is then given by
(1 )
where
The after-tax present value of cash ‡ows for shareholders (…rst term in the bracketed expression) is positive. The terms @AR=@X and @AC=@X are the sensitivities of the barrier options with respect to the state variable X and can be interpreted similarly to the delta of an option. Since the AR term represents a put option, its derivative with respect to X is negative. Conversely, the @AC=@X-term is positive like the delta of a plain vanilla call option. The term in parentheses following @AR=@X is negative, and it is made up of the after-tax cash ‡ows to shareholders upon default minus what is paid out to both classes of bondholders. The term in parentheses following @AC=@X is also negative and consists of the value of equity after conversion minus the after-tax present value of the cash ‡ow plus the proceeds paid out to bondholders. Figure I shows comparative static results for the value of equity and the equity beta with a varying proportion of convertible to total debt '. In this …gure, I o¤set an increase in the convertible debt coupon by an proportional decrease of the straight debt coupon.
< INSERT FIGURE I ABOUT HERE >
From Figure I we see that the equity beta is increasing with ': The reason for this is that the higher fraction of convertible debt shifts the concave part of the convertible debt payo¤ function towards the right. Convertible bondholders will convert later, because they do not want to loose the coupon payments. This right-shift of the concave part of the payo¤ function emphasizes the lower, convex part of the payo¤ function and makes the payo¤ to shareholders less concave. This is analogous to increased risk for shareholders, and therefore, expected returns should be higher for …rms with a high proportion of convertible debt.
Prediction 3: Firms that have a large fraction of convertible debt in the capital structure have higher expected stock returns.
Variables, Empirical Strategy, and Data
In the following sections I test the main predictions of the model and …nd compelling evidence in favor of the model's predictions.
Variables
Existing empirical and theoretical studies of corporate reorganization and capital structure motivate the choice of my empirical proxies. To proxy for renegotiation frictions, I use the number of institutional shareholders. I measure secured debt as the fraction of secured to total debt. I also measure convertible debt as the fraction of convertible to total debt. I proxy for liquidation costs with intangible assets, and …nally, research and development expenses to total assets and CEO shareholding are my proxies for bargaining power in potential renegotiations.
Renegotiation frictions
Renegotiation frictions indicate how easily debt renegotiations are carried out. They in ‡uence the probability of a successful out-of-court workout, and they may also hinder the Chapter 11 renegotiation. Debt renegotiations are especially di¢ cult, when they involve many parties with diverse interests [e.g. Hege and Mella-Barral (2005) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) ]. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue, for instance, that dispersed public debt makes debt more di¢ cult to renegotiate because of free-rider problems. Moreover, Bris et al. (2006) …nd that the time that a Chapter 11 …rm needs to con…rm a reorganization plan is positively and signi…cantly related to the number of creditors. Much like the dispersion of bondholders, the dispersion of equityholders also hinder renegotiation due to coordination problems. To capture this idea, I follow Davydenko and Strebulaev (2006) and use the number of institutional shareholders as a proxy for renegotiation frictions. More speci…cally, I use the normalized number of shareholders, de…ned as the logarithm of the number of di¤erent institutional shareholders divided by the logarithm of the market value of the …rm's equity. 7 
Secured and convertible debt
Since secured debt is directly observable, I measure secured debt by the proportion of secured to total debt. Similarly, I measure convertible debt by the proportion of total convertible to total debt. 7 I also use debt dispersion as a proxy for renegotiation frictions and get qualitatively similar results. I measure dispersion as one minus the proportion of debt maturing within one or three years to total debt. The idea is that other debt than short term debt is likely to be more dispersed which makes debt renegotiation harder.
Liquidation costs
Liquidation costs are the surplus that can be preserved through renegotiation. I use asset intangibility as a measure of liquidation costs. The asset tangibility measure was introduced by Berger et al. (1996) and recently used by Almeida and Campello (2007) to investigate the e¤ect of …nancial constraints on corporate investment and by Garlappi et al. (2006) in their study on default risk and stock returns. It is a …rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation. Berger et al. (1996) …nd that a dollar of book asset value generates, on average, 71.5 cents in exit value for total receivables, 54.7 cents for inventory and 53.5 cents for capital. They also add cash to the tangible part of assets. The measure of tangibility is thus a weighted average of receivables, inventories, net power, plant and equipment, and cash, scaled by total book assets. In actual tests, I use one minus this measure of tangibility, which is positively related to liquidation costs. 8 
Bargaining power
Following Davydenko and Strebulaev (2006) , the proxy for bargaining power is CEO shareholding, the sum of common and restricted shares held by a CEO divided by the common shares outstanding of the …rm. Management, and especially the CEO, plays an important role in any negotiation. For instance, management has the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization within 120 days of entering Chapter 11. Moreover, during that period it can allocate the creditors to a particular class, which may be critical in gaining consent to a reorganization plan [Franks and Torous (1989) ]. Betker (1995) shows that a 10% increase in CEO shareholdings increases equity deviations from the APR in Chapter 11 by as much as 1.2% of …rm value. The rationale is that the more shares managers hold in the company, the more e¤ort they will exert to extract rents from creditors in the case of …nancial distress.
In addition, and following Garlappi et al. (2006) , I use R&D expenses to total assets as a measure for bargaining power of shareholders. The intuition is that …rms with high research and development costs are vulnerable to liquidity shortages in …nancial distress. These …rms are thus more likely to have cash ‡ow problems, which puts them in a disadvantaged bargaining position with creditors.
Identifying distressed …rms
The prediction of the model is that the e¤ect of renegotiation frictions and secured debt is more pronounced for …rms close to default. To investigate this prediction, I try to identify …rms with high default risk and compare the results to the results for a sample of healthy …rms.
There are several ways to proxy for a …rm's level of …nancial distress and its probability of bankruptcy in the short run. The di¤erent models are usually based on accounting data or on stock market data and are mainly constructed using multiple discriminant analysis [Altman (1968) ] or multiple choice analysis [ Zmijewski (1984) ].
Following the literature on bankruptcy prediction, I use Altman's Z-score to identify …rms in …nancial distress. 9 I calculate the Z-score for every …rm-month observation. Then, I pool all observations and split the sample into three groups based on the Z-score. Accordingly, the group of …rms with the lowest Z-score contains the …rms that are most likely to experience …nancial distress. 10 (2007) . The second proxy is the probability of bankruptcy based on Zmijewski's (1984) multiple choice analysis. The results using these two alternative measures of distress are very similar to the ones I obtain using the Z-score.
Empirical strategy
I test the predictions of the model with a regression based and a non-parametric portfolio approach. I carry out the regression-based approach using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. In the …rst stage, I regress cross-sectionally monthly returns on a set of …rm characteristics. In the second stage, I take the average of the time-series coe¢ cients and calculate corresponding t-statistics.
For the portfolio analysis, I pool in each year all …rms and divide the pool into quantiles based on a proxy for renegotiation frictions, secured debt, convertible debt, liquidations costs, or bargaining power. I then report average monthly returns and t-statistics for these portfolios, as well as the return di¤erences between the quantiles. Since there is a number of known determinants of average returns, I also calculate characteristic-adjusted returns. I use the procedure of Daniel et al. (1997) to adjust individual stock returns for size, book-tomarket, and momentum. 9 The Z-score is calculated as follows:
1 0 Splitting the sample in three groups is admittedly arbitrary. This choice, however, tries to balance two o¤setting concerns. On the one hand, I wish to capture …rms with a Z-score low enough to identify …rms that are most likely in …nancial distress. On the other hand, making too many groups reduces the sample signi…cantly and makes the portfolio construction unreliable. Choosing three groups strikes a balance between the two concerns. Although the results in the paper are presented with splits into three groups, in unreported tables I replicate most …ndings using more or less groups, and the results are qualitatively similar. My sample includes all …rms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with sharecodes 10 and 11 that are contained in the intersection of the CRSP monthly returns …le and the Compustat industrial annual …le. To ensure that the accounting variables are known before the returns they are used to explain, I match the accounting data for all …scal year-ends in calendar year t 1 with the returns for July of year t to June of year t + 1 [Fama and French (1992) ].
Data
For size I use CRSP market equity for June of year t. Book equity is total assets (6) minus total liabilities (9+34). The book-to-market ratio is calculated by dividing book equity by Compustat market equity, which is Compustat stock price (199) times shares outstanding at …scal year end (25) . Leverage is the ratio of book liabilities (total assets (6) minus book equity) to total market value of the …rm. Momentum is the …rm's past 12-month average return, skipping the most recent month.
I exclude …nancial …rms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and regulated …rms (SIC codes above 9000) because their accounting data do probably not have the same meaning as for non-…nancial or non-regulated …rms due to statutory capital requirements and other restrictions. Moreover, a …rm must have information on the book value of assets, the market value of equity, momentum, total debt (9+34), secured debt (241), cash (1), power, plant and equipment (8) , convertible debt (79), and institutional ownership to be included in the sample. Finally, I winsorize all variables at the one percent level in each tail to reduce the impact of outliers. 11 Table I contains a summary and the de…nitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
< INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE >

Descriptive Statistics
The full …nal sample consists of 575'146 …rm-month observations, except for the variable ceoshareholding. This variable is constructed using the ExecuComp database that only begins in 1992. Table II contains summary statistics for the main variables. 1 1 Note that winsorizing the independent variables has no e¤ect on the results of the portfolio analysis, since extreme observations fall into the same groups before and after winsorization. For the Fama and MacBeth (1973) analysis, the results remain qualitatively the same without any winsorization.
< INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE >
The mean return (return) is positive with 1.05 percent and the median return is zero. This indicates a positively skewed distribution of stock returns, which is consistent with empirical …ndings. The proxy for liquidation costs, intangibles, has a mean value of 46.4 percent. On average, …rms have 58 institutional shareholders, with a median value of 22. The average amount of equity held by a CEO is 12.4 percent compared to a median holding of 3.9 percent. The value is higher than the one reported by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2006) . This discrepancy, however, may be attributed to di¤erences in the samples. The mean amount of secured debt held by …rms is 36 percent which is consistent with the number reported by Barclay and Smith (1995) . Firms hold on average 6.8 percent convertible debt, which is substantially lower than the amount of secured debt. The mean market leverage is about 25 percent, and the average return over the past twelve month is 1.3 percent.
Since the type of debt …nancing plays an important role in this paper, Table III sheds some light on what kind of …rms have secured and convertible debt outstanding.
< INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE >
Panel A contains descriptive statistics for …rms without secured debt, and Panel B for …rms with a positive amount of secured debt outstanding. Firms without secured debt tend to be larger and hold more cash. By contrast, …rms with secured debt in their capital structure tend to have a higher leverage, higher asset volatility, a higher probability of default, and a higher book-to-market ratio.
Panel C and Panel D contain the same statistics for convertible debt. Firms without any convertible debt are smaller, have less cash, less debt, a lower leverage and a lower expected default frequency. The asset volatility and the book-to-market ratio are very similar across the …rms with and without convertible debt outstanding. It thus seems that convertible bonds do not reduce the incentives to increase the risk of the companies in my sample of …rms.
Results
This section reports the main results. The …rst subsection documents evidence supporting the model's prediction using the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation methodology. The second subsection uses the portfolio approach to test the predictions of the model.
Fama and MacBeth Analysis
To examine the relation between renegotiation frictions, debt structure, and stock returns, I perform regression analysis using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. In each month, I regress monthly returns on …rm characteristics, and then I average the time-series of the estimated coe¢ cients and calculate the corresponding t-statistics. While the portfolio analysis in the next subsection presents a non-parametric test of the predictions derived from the model, a regression analysis provides multivariate evidence of the economic mechanisms that are at play. These regressions allow to analyze the relation between …rm characteristics and average stock returns without imposing any restrictions on portfolio construction, and allow to control for additional alternative explanations. 12 Table IV presents regressions for various speci…cations. In each estimation, I control for …rm characteristics that are known to a¤ect stock returns. These include the size of a …rm, the book-to-market ratio, momentum returns, and leverage.
< INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE >
Panel A of Table IV presents the coe¢ cient estimates for the full sample, absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses, and in brackets the changes in average monthly returns when the independent variable increases by one standard deviation.
The model predicts that …rms subject to high renegotiation frictions have higher expected returns. The reason for this is that if renegotiation is likely to fail, shareholders will recover less …rm value upon default compared to a situation when renegotiation is successful. This increases the risk of equity and hence expected returns. We should therefore observe a positive sign for the coe¢ cient of renegotiation frictions. Using the proxy shareholders for renegotiation frictions, this prediction is con…rmed in Panel A of Table IV. In column 1 the coe¢ cient of shareholders is positive and statistically signi…cant at the …ve percent level. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient and its statistical signi…cance remain unaltered when I add secured debt (column 3), convertible debt (column 5) or both to the regression (column 6). These …rst results are consistent with the model's prediction.
The same result holds for secured debt. The coe¢ cient of secured is positive and statistically signi…cant in column 2. Adding shareholders (column 3) or convertible (column 6) does not change the coe¢ cient nor the signi…cance. This result is strongly supportive of the model's prediction saying that …rms with a higher fraction of secured debt have higher average returns because secured debt reduces the amount of …rm value that is subject to renegotiation upon default.
The results in Panel A of Table IV also support the model's third prediction regarding convertible debt. 13 The coe¢ cient of convertible is positive and statistically signi…cant in 1 2 I also estimate pooled regressions with monthly dummy variables and obtain very similar results. Moreover, including the value-weighted CRSP market index does not change the results either. Estimation results are available on request. 1 3 Since a large proportion of …rms reports zero convertible debt, I include a dummy variable equal to one if the …rm has convertible debt, and zero otherwise. I do this in order to isolate the e¤ect of a higher proportion of convertible debt on stock returns (as predicted by the model). columns 4 to 6, indicating that …rms with a higher proportion of convertible debt earn, on average, higher stock returns. Once more, the results remain unchanged when I include secured or shareholders in the regression. While the e¤ects are statistically signi…cant for all variables of interest, the economic impact is rather moderate for the full sample. An increase of one standard deviation in the variable shareholders increases average stock returns by 13 basis points per month. Accordingly, increasing the fraction of secured debt by one standard deviation leads, on average, to a 7 basis points increase in monthly stock returns. Finally, increasing the fraction of convertible debt by one standard deviation increases average stock returns by 11 basis points per month.
Note also that the estimated coe¢ cients of the control variables are consistent with available empirical evidence. Indeed, the book-to-market ratio has a strong positive e¤ect on stock returns, re ‡ecting the value premium. Also, leverage has a negative impact on stock returns. Moreover, size and momentum are not signi…cant. For size this is consistent with evidence showing that the size e¤ect disappears in more recent sample periods.
The model further predicts that the e¤ects of renegotiation frictions and secured debt are more relevant for …rms close to …nancial distress. To investigate this additional prediction, I classify …rms into three groups based on their Z-score. Then, I de…ne the group of …rms with low Z-scores as distressed …rms. Accordingly, the group of …rms with high Z-scores contains healthy …rms. Panel B of Table IV presents estimation results for distressed …rms and Panel C reports results for healthy …rms.
From Panel B we see that the main results remain unaltered for distressed …rms. More speci…cally, the coe¢ cient of shareholders is positive and statistically signi…cant. Note that with respect to the full sample, the coe¢ cient increases slightly in magnitude, leading to a more pronounced economic impact on stock returns by about 3 basis points per month. Secured is also positive and statistically signi…cant. Consistent with the model's prediction, the economic e¤ect of secured is twice as high for distressed …rms than for the full sample …rms. The e¤ect of secured debt on stock returns thus seems to be more important for distressed …rms than for the average sample …rm. Finally, the coe¢ cient of convertible is also positive, but looses slightly signi…cance for distressed …rms.
When I contrast these results with the group of healthy …rms (Panel C), we observe di¤erences for the coe¢ cients of secured and shareholders. For healthy …rms, the coe¢ cient of secured looses its statistical signi…cance. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of shareholders also looses statistical and economic signi…cance. Overall, these results support the prediction that the e¤ect of renegotiation frictions and secured debt on stock returns is more pronounced for distressed than for healthy …rms. The coe¢ cient of convertible remains positive and signi…cant for healthy …rms.
Taken together, the regression-based approach provides evidence that renegotiation fric-tions and the debt structure have a systematic positive e¤ect on stock returns. Consistent with the predictions from the model, stock returns are higher for …rms facing large renegotiation di¢ culties, and having more secured and convertible debt outstanding. In the following, I further investigate the relation between renegotiation frictions, debt structure, and stock returns using the portfolio approach.
Portfolio Analysis
The main advantage of the portfolio approach is that it does not presuppose any functionalform relationship between the variables. Moreover, the portfolio approach is a standard method in the empirical asset pricing literature to analyze the impact of …rm characteristics on stock returns, and therefore allows comparison with this related work. At the end of each June from 1985 to 2005, I pool all …rms and sort stocks into …ve quantiles based on a proxy for liquidation cost, renegotiation frictions, bargaining power, and the fraction of secured or convertible debt. I then report average monthly returns for these portfolios, as well as the return di¤erence between the …rst and …fth quantile together with the t-statistic.
Since there are a number of known determinants of average returns, I also report characteristicadjusted returns. I use the procedure of Daniel et al. (1997) to adjust individual stock returns for size, book-to-market, and momentum. I take all …rms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with sharecodes 10 and 11 that are contained in the intersection of the CRSP monthly returns …le and the Compustat industrial annual …le. Each month, I sort these …rms in the sample into size quintiles, and then within each size quintile into book-to-market quintiles. I divide each of these 25 portfolios further into quintiles based on the …rm's past 12-month average return, skipping the most recent month. I average stocks within each of these 125 portfolios to form a benchmark that is subtracted from each individual stock's return. Accordingly, the expected value of this excess return is zero if size, book-to-market, and momentum completely describe the cross-section of expected returns. Table V reports the results for the portfolio analysis. In each panel, I report the raw returns and below the characteristic-adjusted average returns, as well as the average spread between the …rst and the …fth quantile along with its t-statistic. In order to test the predictions from the model, I report results for distressed …rms as well as results for healthy …rms based on the Z-score.
< INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE >
Panel A of Table V contains portfolio returns for distressed …rms based on the Z-score, and Panel B contains the portfolio returns for healthy …rms.
The model predicts that …rms subject to high renegotiation frictions have higher expected returns. We should thus observe that the average return increases when going from quantile 1 (lowest renegotiation frictions) to quantile 5 (highest renegotiation frictions). Using the proxy shareholders for renegotiation frictions, this prediction is con…rmed in Panel A of Table V . The monthly raw return increases from 0.767 percent in quantile 1 to 1.00 percent in quantile 5. The di¤erence of 0.23 percentage points per month is statistically signi…cant at the ten percent level. Adjusting the returns for book-to-market, size, and momentum e¤ects does not change the result. The di¤erence between quantile 1 and quantile 5 remains statistically signi…cant.
Note also that the di¤erence is economically large. Had an investor sold the portfolio in quantile 1 and invested the proceeds in the quantile 5 portfolio, this investor would have earned an excess return of 26 basis points per month (3 percent per year).
A similar result holds for secured debt. In Panel A, the average raw returns increase from 0.861 percent in quantile 1 to 1.158 percent in quantile 5, and the risk-adjusted return increases from -0.589 percent to -0.448 percent. The di¤erence between quantile 1 and quantile 5 is statistically signi…cant for the raw returns, not, however, for the risk-adjusted returns. Despite this, the result is generally supportive of the model's prediction regarding the relation between secured debt and stock returns. A higher fraction of secured debt generates higher average returns because secured debt reduces the amount of …rm value that is subject to renegotiation upon default.
For convertible debt, the results are even stronger. The raw return increases from 0.06 percent (quantile 1) to 0.87 percent (quantile 5), and the risk-adjusted return increases from -1.42 percent to -0.40 percent. The di¤erences are statistically signi…cant and economically large. Going short the portfolio in quantile 1 and long the portfolio in quantile 5 would yield a excess return of 100 basis points per month (12 percent per year).
Strikingly, when we look at secured and convertible for healthy …rms, this e¤ect almost disappears. The average monthly return of quantile 1 is not statistically di¤erent from the average return of quantile 5 (raw and risk-adjusted returns). This is consistent with the conjecture that shareholders in distressed …rms are more concerned about their stake in the …rm upon default than shareholders in …rms that do not have to fear immediate default. Shareholders in distressed …rms will thus require a premium for their secured debt, which is re ‡ected in higher average returns. For renegotiation frictions, the positive e¤ect on average stock returns is also present in the group of healthy …rms.
Two other predictions from the model are that …rms that are subject to high liquidation costs, and …rms whose shareholders have high bargaining power have lower expected returns. These predictions are consistent with the ones of Garlappi et al. (2006) . The intuition for these predictions is that creditors are more likely to give up some …rm value to shareholders if their alternative is to face high cost of liquidation or if shareholders have a lot of bargaining power. From shareholders' perspective, this reduces the risk of equity and hence expected returns. Table VI shows results for intangibles as a proxy for liquidation costs and for ceoshareholding and rd as proxies for bargaining power. The data strongly support the model's prediction for intangibles, rd, and ceoshareholding. For liquidation costs, average monthly raw and risk-adjusted returns are signi…cantly higher in the …rst quantile (low liquidation costs) compared to the …fth quantile (high liquidation costs).
< INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE >
The same pattern emerges for the variable bargaining power, measured by ceoshareholding. Average returns (raw and risk-adjusted) are signi…cantly higher in the …rst quantile compared to the …fth quantile (high bargaining power). Finally, the result also holds using rd as an alternative proxy for bargaining power. Average returns in the …rst quantile (high bargaining power) are signi…cantly lower than in quantile 5 (low bargaining power). Overall, the results in Table VI In sum, the portfolio analysis provides additional support for the model's predictions and underlines the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) analysis. The analysis shows that …rms close to distress earn, on average, a higher return when renegotiation is di¢ cult, when they have a large fraction of secured or convertible debt, low liquidation costs or low bargaining power.
Discussion
The analysis has shown so far that the strategic variables such as shareholders, secure, and convertible a¤ect stock returns even after taking into account other variables (size, market, book-to-market ratio, and momentum) that are related to priced factors. A plausible reason put forth in this paper why these variables are relevant in explaining stock returns, is that they capture a di¤erent dimension of a …rm's exposure to risk factors. From the model we know that this dimension relates to the strategic behavior of shareholders in default, and their possibilities to extract rents from creditors. This dimension becomes most relevant for …rms in …nancial distress, and it seems that this e¤ect is not subsumed or not correctly measured by the other variables accounting for the cross-section of expected stock returns. Thus, the e¤ect explored in this paper does not identify a new priced factor, but rather points to an economic mechanism prevalent close to default and related to default risk that has not yet been explored. 14 
Robustness and Further Evidence
So far, the analysis has provided evidence on the relation between renegotiation frictions, debt structure, and stock returns. In this section I perform several robustness checks to further support the results presented so far.
Endogeneity Bias
A potential question about my inference is whether the proportion of secured and convertible debt could be determined endogenously. To explore the potential importance of this issue, I instrument for secured and convertible debt and implement a two-step GMM estimation. This estimator generates e¢ cient estimates of the coe¢ cients as well as consistent estimates of the standard errors [see Hayashi (2000) ]. Ideally, the instrumental variables are independent of returns but are correlated with secured debt. I use income tax (16) over pretax income (170), capitalized lease obligations (84) over total assets, and current debt over total debt as instruments for secured and convertible debt. Panel A of Table VII reports the results of these estimations for secured debt, and Panel B of Table VII presents the results for convertible debt. The positive e¤ect of the proportion of secured and convertible debt on stock returns is unaltered.
< INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE >
The choice of instruments is motivated by Barclay and Smith (1995) and their analysis on the priority structure of corporate liabilities. Barclay and Smith (1995) use tax-loss carryforward and average tax rates to explain the fraction of secured debt held by …rms and …nd that they are signi…cantly related to the proportion of secured debt. Moreover, since tax rates are set by the federal or state government, it is likely that the resulting tax payments are exogenous to stock returns. Further, the amount of short term debt is more likely to be related to the cost of debt than to stock returns. If bond spreads are low, a …rm might issue more public debt, which has usually longer maturity, thereby decreasing the proportion of short-term debt [ (Davydenko and Strebulaev (2006) ]. Further, Barclay and Smith (1995) …nd that the amount of capitalized leases of a …rm is determined signi…cantly whether an industry is regulated or not. This indicates that the amount of capitalized leases is at least to some extent a function of exogenous factors, and is unlikely to be related to stock returns.
The results in Panels A and B of Table VII con…rm the results of the previous sections. In Panel A, the coe¢ cient of secured debt is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in the group of distressed …rms. Moreover, the coe¢ cients are higher compared to the non-instrumented estimates of section 4, implying a larger economic impact of secured debt on stock returns (the coe¢ cients rise from 0.003 to 0.009). Further, the values from Hansen's J-Statistic of overidentifying restrictions show that the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected in column 1 and column 2. Finally, and as expected, the coe¢ cient of secured is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for the group of healthy …rms. Again, this supports the prediction that the e¤ect of secured debt on stock returns is more pronounced for distressed than for healthy …rms.
The coe¢ cient estimates for convertible debt are also positive and statistically signi…cant at the one percent level for distressed …rms, supporting the results of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimations and the portfolio analysis. For healthy …rms, the coe¢ cient of convertible is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. These results strongly support the results from the previous subsections and the model's predictions. Finally, the values of the Hansen's JStatistic of overidentifying restrictions are well above the critical level to reject instrument validity.
For renegotiation frictions, it is hard to think of a reason why institutional shareholding could be endogenous and negatively related to stock returns. Given the remarkable consistency of the results for the regression and portfolio analysis, I believe that they are unlikely driven by endogeneity.
The analysis using instrumental variables to instrument for the proportion of secured and convertible debt shows that the results in this paper are robust to an endogeneity bias. The coe¢ cient estimates for secured and convertible debt are signi…cant and similar to those of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) analysis of section 4.
Alternative Measures of Distress
Hitherto, the analysis shows that renegotiation frictions and debt structure have a statistically and economically signi…cant impact on stock returns. The model predicts that this e¤ect is reinforced for distressed …rms. To provide further support for this prediction I use two alternative measures of distress. The …rst additional measure of distress is the distance to default, constructed along the lines of Bharath and Shumway (2004) and Du¢ e et al. (2007) . It is computed numerically as
where V is the market value of assets, F is the face value of debt, is the expected asset growth, and V is the volatility of …rm value. 15 Roughly speaking, the distance to default is the number of standard deviations of asset growth by which a …rm's market value of assets exceeds the face value of debt. 16 Du¢ e et al. (2007) …nd that the distance to default is economically important for explaining the term structure of default probabilities.
To test the predictions, I construct two groups of …rms based on the distance to default. I de…ne …rms with a below-median distance to default as distressed …rms. Accordingly, …rms with an above-median distance to default are healthy …rms. Panel A of Table VIII contains the results from the portfolio analysis based on the distance to default.
< INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE >
For renegotiation frictions, the proxy shareholders increases from quantile 1 to quantile 5 for distressed …rm, and the di¤erence between quantile 1 and quantile 5 is signi…cant for raw and risk-adjusted returns. The di¤erence of 56 basis points is also economically important. By contrast, the di¤erence between quantile 1 and quantile 5 is less pronounced for healthy …rms. This supports the prediction from the model that renegotiation frictions have a positive e¤ect on stock returns, and that this e¤ect is more important for distressed …rms.
The results are not as strong for secured and convertible debt. There is, however, a tendency that …rms perform better in quantile 5 than in quantile 1 for distressed …rms. I cannot document this e¤ect for healthy …rms. In this sense, the results with the distance to default as a proxy for distress generally support the results from the previous subsections.
The second additional measure for distress is based on Zmijewski's (1984) probit model for predicting bankruptcy. 17 As for the distance to default, I make two groups of …rms based on the below-and above-median probability of default. Panel B of Table VIII presents the results. For distressed …rms, the results are very similar to the results for the distance to default, but somewhat stronger for convertible debt. For healthy …rms, the e¤ect of secured and convertible debt on stock returns is inconclusive. Taken together, these results suggest that the main …ndings of in this paper are not sensitive to the measure of …nancial distress.
In this section I address several concerns that might arise due to endogeneity and to the measurement of …nancial distress. The results support the model's predictions and the conclusions from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) and portfolio analysis.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes within a contingent claims framework whether debt structure and the strategic interaction between shareholders and bondholders in default a¤ects expected stock returns. In this framework, shareholders can act strategically to induce default and recover a substantial fraction of …rm value, even though they are residual claimants. The implications of the model regarding bargaining power of shareholders, liquidation costs, and expected stock returns are consistent with earlier models and with the available empirical evidence. In 1 7 The probability of default based on the Zmijewski model is ; where N is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. addition, the model generates new predictions regarding the relation between renegotiation frictions, secured and convertible debt, and stock returns. In particular, the model predicts that …rms have higher expected stock returns if renegotiation is likely to fail, if …rms have a greater fraction of their debt that is secured, or if …rms have a large fraction of convertible debt in their capital structure.
Using a large sample of publicly traded US …rms between 1985 and 2005, I …nd that stock returns of distressed …rms are increasing with renegotiation frictions, and with the fraction of secured or convertible debt. These results are consistent with the model's predictions.
The main results are stable to robustness checks. Speci…cally, I correct for a possible endogeneity bias, and I use an alternative measure of …nancial distress. The main conclusions remain unaltered. Overall, these new results highlight that …rm characteristics such as the type of debt and frictions that in ‡uence strategic actions are an important component of stock returns.
7 Appendix 1
Straight debt
The value of equity E(X) satis…es the following ordinary di¤erential equation (ODE)
where E X and E XX are the …rst and second derivatives of the equity value with respect to the state variable X. The ODE is solved subject to the value-matching, smooth-pasting, and no-bubbles condition:
The general solution to A.1 is Condition A.4 implies that A = 0. Using A.2 and A.3 in conjunction with A.5, algebraic derivations yield the desired results. The total value of the …rm is then the sum of the values of equity and debt which is equal to the present value of cash ‡ows minus expected liquidation costs plus expected tax shields. The value of debt can then be deduced from the value of the …rm and the value of equity. To get the expression for the equity beta, apply Ito's lemma to the value of equity. This yields
where X is the beta of the …rm's cash ‡ow. Normalizing X to 1, and taking the derivative of E(X) with respect to X, multiplying by X=E and replacing for X B yields the expression for the equity beta.
Secured Debt
The value of equity satis…es the same ODE as in the straight debt case (A.1). The valuematching, smooth-pasting, and no-bubbles conditions are given by:
Using the same form of general solution A.5 in conjunction with A.9 and A.10, algebraic derivations yield the desired results. Applying Itô's lemma to the value of equity, and using the same steps as in the straight debt case, one can derive the equity beta.
Convertible Debt
The value of equity satis…es the same di¤erential equation as in the straight and secured debt case (A.1). The lower and upper boundary conditions to price equity in the presence of convertible debt are as follows:
Using the same form of general solution as in the straight and secured debt case, algebraic manipulation yields the value of equity. To obtain the value of convertible debt, de…ne ' = cc=(cs + cc). If there is renegotiation in default, convertible debtholders bargain with straight bondholders on their side as one party against shareholders and recover ' (1 ) [X B =(r )] (1 ) of …rm value. If there is liquidation, convertible bondholders share the unlevered …rm value after liquidation costs and get ' (1 ) [X B =(r )] (1 ): Upon conversion, convertible bondholders obtain a fraction of the value of equity after conversion, or ( (X C ) D (X C )). The boundary conditions for convertible bondholders to price their claim are:
Using the same techniques as for the value of equity yields the value of convertible debt.
To derive the expression for the equity beta, apply Itô's lemma to the value of equity, and the result follows.
Appendix 2
Taking the derivative of the equity beta with respect to q and X, we get the following expression:
The …rst line in the numerator is positive, and so is the term in square brackets in the numerator. Since the denominator is negative, the whole term is negative. This …gure shows the value of equity and the equity beta for varying fractions of convertible to total debt ', and for a cash ‡ow of 10. The parameter values used to produce the …gures are: risk free rate r is 6%, is 2%, the coupon cs is 5, cash ‡ow volatility is 30%, is 0.5, renegotiation frictions q is 0.5, bargaining power is 0.5, and liquidation costs are 5%. is the normalized number of institutional shareholders, ceoshareholding is the percentage of total equity held by the CEO, secured is the proportion of secured to total debt, convertible is the proportion of convertible to total debt, rd is research and development expenses to total assets, size is the log market value of equity, book-to-market is the book-to-market ratio, leverage is debt over market value of the …rm, and momentum is the average stock return over the past 12 month. . cash is cash and cash equivalents, total assets is total book assets, total debt is total debt outstanding, leverage is total debt over the market value of the …rm, assetvol is the volatility of assets, edf is the expected default frequency, and book-to-market is the book-to-market ratio. shareholders is the normalized number of institutional shareholders, secured is the proportion of secured to total debt, convertible is the proportion of convertible to total debt, and dconv is a dummy equal to one if the …rm has convertible debt outstanding, and zero otherwise. The control variables are de…ned according to Table I . Each month, a cross-sectional regression is estimated. The time-series mean of the monthly regression coe¢ cients and absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The numbers in brackets are the changes in average monthly returns when the independent variable increases by one standard deviation. Coe¢ cients marked ***, **, and * are signi…cant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi…cance level, respectively. In June of each year, stocks are grouped into quantiles based on renegotiation frictions, secured debt, and convertible debt. The grouping for secured and convertible debt is done conditional that a …rm has secured or convertible debt outstanding. The average monthly returns (in percent) of the quantile portfolios are reported, as well as the di¤erence between quantile 1 and quantile 5 and the corresponding t-statistic. Firm-level raw returns are unadjusted returns averaged across …rms within the same quantile. Firm-level adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the return on a characteristic-based benchmark from each …rm's return, then averaging within the same quantile. The characteristic-based benchmarks are constructed following Daniel et al. (1997) to account for the premia associated with size, book-to-market, and momentum. shareholders is the normalized number of institutional shareholders, secured is the proportion of secured to total debt, and convertible is the proportion of convertible to total debt. N is the average number of observations per quantile. Coe¢ cients marked ***, **, and * are signi…cant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi…cance level (one-sided), respectively. In June of each year, stocks are grouped into terciles based on renegotiation frictions, secured debt, and convertible debt. The average monthly returns (in percent) of the tercile portfolios are reported, as well as the di¤erence between tercile 1 and tercile 3 and the corresponding tstatistic. Firm-level raw returns are unadjusted returns averaged across …rms within the same tercile. Firm-level adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the return on a characteristic-based benchmark from each …rm's return, then averaging within the same tercile. The characteristicbased benchmarks are constructed following Daniel et al. (1997) to account for the premia associated with size, book-to-market, and momentum. intangibles is one minus tangible assets over total assets, ceoshareholding is the percentage of total equity owned by the CEO, and rd is research and development expenses to total assets. N is the average number of observations in a quantile. Coe¢ cients marked ***, **, and * are signi…cant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi…cance level (one-sided), respectively. This table presents results from a 2-step e¢ cient GMM estimation using instruments for secured and convertible debt. The dependent variable is the monthly stock return. shareholders is the normalized number of institutional shareholders, secured is the proportion of secured to total debt, and convertible is the proportion of convertible to total debt. The control variables are de…ned according to Table I . All four speci…cations include monthly dummies. The instruments for secured and convertible debt are income tax over pretax income, capitalized lease obligations to total assets, and current debt to total debt. The Hansen J-Statistic of overidentifying restrictions and its p-values are presented at the bottom of the table. Coe¢ cients marked ***, **, and * are signi…cant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi…cance level, respectively. In June of each year, stocks are grouped into quantiles based on renegotiation frictions, secured debt, and convertible debt. The grouping for secured and convertible debt is done conditional on the respective debt outstanding. The average monthly returns (in percent) of the quantile portfolios are reported, as well as the di¤erence between quantile 1 and quantile 3 and the corresponding t-statistic. Firm-level raw returns are unadjusted returns averaged across …rms within the same quantile. Firm-level adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the return on a characteristic-based benchmark from each …rm's return, then averaging within the same quantile. The characteristic-based benchmarks are constructed following Daniel et al. (1997) to account for the premia associated with size, book-to-market, and momentum. shareholders is the normalized number of institutional shareholders, secured is the proportion of secured to total debt, and convertible is the proportion of convertible to total debt. N is the average number of observations per quantile. Coe¢ cients marked ***, **, and * are signi…cant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi…cance level (one-sided), respectively. 
